








# Национальная стратегия биологической защиты США

3

## Реализация национальной стратегии биологической защиты США




### ЦЕЛИ:


1. Обеспечение осведомленности о рисках и их обнаружении для принятия обоснованных решений по мероприятиям биологической защиты;
2. Обеспечение возможностей по биологической защите для предотвращения биоинцидентов;
3. Обеспечение готовности к биологической защите для снижения негативного влияния биоинцидентов;
4. Быстрое реагирование для снижения негативного влияния биоинцидентов;
5. Содействие восстановлению сообщества, экономики и окружающей среды после биоинцидентов

Объем финансирования на 5 лет  
**88** млрд. долларов

## Организационная схема реализации Стратегии



## Создание глобальной архитектуры предупреждения, реагирования и нейтрализации биологических угроз в интересах США



## Финансируемые Пентагоном биологические лаборатории








# Стратегия Управления по снижению угрозы министерства обороны США (DTRA) на 2022–2027 годы

4

## Обновленная стратегия DTRA



**Цели:**  
Обеспечение безопасного, защищенного, надёжного и эффективного ядерного сдерживания  
Противодействие оружию массового поражения и возникающим угрозам  
Предоставление возможностей Объединенным силам и союзникам/партнерам конкурировать и побеждать противников  
Создание адаптивного и жизнеспособного Управления




## Сокрытые информации о деятельности компании Black & Veatch на территории Украины




Регистрационная карта проекта по внедрению электронной системы контроля заболеваемости и системы контроля за патогенами (PACS) на Украине. Исполнитель проекта - компания Black & Veatch



«Опасно: Налогоплательщики финансируют биологические лаборатории – в Украине!»



«...собственность правительства США...»



В отчетах полностью удалена информация о персональных данных сотрудников подрядных организаций и участников тренингов, об исследовательской деятельности на Украине и ее результатах





# Исследование возбудителя COVID-19 в Бостонском университете



5

Создание модифицированного вируса на основе штамма омикрон и исходного «уханьского» варианта, вызывающего 80-процентную смертность модельных животных

Outrage as Boston University CREATES Omicron strain that has an 80% kill rate in mice | Daily Mail Online

MailOnline

Home | News | U.S. | Sport | TV&Showbiz | Australia | Femail | Health | Science | Money | Travel

Latest Headlines | Monkeypox | Covid-19 | Dr Anthony Fauci | CDC | WHO | NHS

**EXCLUSIVE: 'This is playing with fire - it could spark a lab-generated pandemic': Experts slam Boston lab where scientists have created a new deadly Omicron strain with an 80% kill rate in mice**

- Researchers added Omicron's spike protein to the original Wuhan Covid strain
- Omicron's spike is highly mutated which made it the most infectious variant ever
- Omicron is also far less deadly, causing mild disease in most affected animals
- Study intended to discover if spike protein determines deadliness of infection
- 8 in 10 mice infected with the lab-created strain died at Boston University lab
- This compares with a 100% fatality rate in mice infected with the Wuhan strain

By CAITLIN TILLEY, HEALTH REPORTER FOR DAILYMAIL.COM and MANSUR SHAHEEN DEPUTY HEALTH EDITOR FOR DAILYMAIL.COM  
PUBLISHED: 16:02 GMT, 17 October 2022 | UPDATED: 22:03 GMT, 28 October 2022

31k shares

4.7k View comments

**«Игра с огнем: это способно вызвать эпидемию, созданную в лаборатории: эксперты критикуют бостонскую лабораторию, где ученые создали новый смертельный штамм омикрон с 80 % летальностью для мышей»**

The researchers were attempting to discover whether the spike protein on the Omicron variant – responsible for making it the most transmissible of Covid strains to date – is also behind the virus having a particularly mild effect on infected hosts, with most suffering only slight illness.

The resultant chimera was only slightly less deadly than the Wuhan strain, indicating that the spike protein is not behind the attenuation of its effects on hosts.

The team behind its creation announced that as well as 'inflict[ing] severe disease' it also 'robustly escapes vaccine-induced humoral immunity', indicating that the recombinant virus retained the most dangerous properties of its parents.

The revelation exposes how dangerous virus manipulation research continues to go on even in the US, despite fears similar practices may have started the pandemic.

Professor Shmuel Shapira, a leading scientist in the Israeli Government, said: 'This should be totally forbidden, it's plain and simple.'

Gain of function research - when a virus is made more infectious or deadly - is thought to




Boston University's National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories is one of 13 biosafety level 4 labs in the US

**«Бостонская лаборатория возникающих инфекций – одна из 13 лабораторий BSL-4 в США»**

**«Бостонская лаборатория создала новый смертельный штамм COVID»**

## BOSTON LAB MAKES NEW DEADLY COVID STRAIN



**«80 % мышей погибли от нового искусственно созданного штамма, при этом ни одно животное не погибло при инфицировании родительским штаммом омикрон»**

80 percent of mice died from the new man-made Covid strain, while none died from the milder Omicron variant alone, researchers at Boston University's National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories found

## Комментарии в СМИ


STAT  
Boston University researchers' testing of lab-made version of Covid virus draws government scrutiny

**«Исследования бостонского университета по созданию лабораторной версии вируса COVID тщательно изучается правительством»**

But it has become apparent that the research team did not clear the work with the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, which was one of the funders of the project. The agency indicated it is going to be looking for some answers as to why it first learned of the work through media reports.


Emily Erbeling, director of NIAID's division of microbiology and infectious diseases, said the BU team's original grant applications did not specify that the scientists wanted to do this precise work. Nor did the group make clear that it was doing experiments that might involve enhancing a pathogen of pandemic potential in the progress reports it provided to NIAID.

Asked if the research team should have informed NIAID of its intention to do the work, Erbeling said: "We wish that they would have, yes."



Национальная лаборатория по исследованию перспективных инфекционных заболеваний Бостонского университета (шт. Массачусетс, США)





**Experimenting With Disaster**  
**Part 2**

In America's biolabs, hundreds of accidents have gone undisclosed to the public.

## Experimenting With Disaster Part 2

**Experimenting  
With Disaster**  
**Part 3**

**Experimenting With Disaster** In America's biolabs, hundreds of accidents have gone undisclosed to the public.

**«Сотни инцидентов в американских лабораториях остаются скрытыми от общественности»**

**T**HE GRADUATE STUDENT was alone in the lab on a Saturday, handling a mouse infected with a debilitating virus, when the needle slipped. She wore two gowns, two pairs of shoe covers, a hair net, a face mask, and two pairs of gloves. Gingerly, she had pointed the needle at the mouse's abdomen and injected the antibody. The animal was infected with a recombinant strain of Chikungunya virus, a mosquito-borne pathogen that has sparked epidemics in Africa and the Caribbean. Chikungunya can wreak havoc in other regions when the right kind of mosquito is present; in 2007 and 2017 there were outbreaks in Italy, and in 2014 the virus hit Florida, infecting 11 people who had not recently traveled abroad. The researcher stood in the lab, diagnosed in Texas.

«...В 2013 году исследо


**«...В 2013 году исследователь из государственного университета Канзаса повредил палец при манипуляциях с кровью птиц, зараженных ВПГП...»**

**А** searcher was smack in the middle of Manhattan, in a lab one block from Central Park's East Meadow. It was the Friday afternoon before Labor Day in 2011, and people were rushing out of the city for a long weekend. Three days earlier, the ferret had been inoculated with a recombinant strain of 1918 influenza, which killed between 20 and 50 million people when it swept through the world at the end of World War I. To prevent it from sparking another pandemic, 1918 influenza is studied under biosafety level 3 conditions, the second-tightest of biosafety controls available. The researcher at Mount Sinai School of Medicine (now Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai) was wearing protective equip-

**I**ally stupid," virologist Ron Fouchier told *Scientific American* in 2011. Fouchier, of Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, and another scientist, Yoshihiro Kawaoka of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, had separately tweaked the H5N1 virus – an influenza that primarily infects birds – in a way that made it spread more easily in ferrets. H5N1 is a prime pandemic candidate, and ferrets are often used as proxies for humans in flu experiments. When word got out that the two scientists were planning to publish papers detailing their experiments, making a blueprint available to the world, the outcry was extreme. The scientists were trying to better understand H5N1 in order to prevent a pandemic, but critics worried that their experiments could instead cause one – or provide a blueprint for bioterrorists with an outbreak manufacturing guide.

ally stupid," virologist Ron Fouchier told *Scientific American* in 2011. Fouchier, of Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, and another scientist, Yoshihiro Kawaoka of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, had separately tweaked the H5N1 virus – an influenza that primarily infects birds – in a way that made it spread more easily in ferrets. H5N1 is a flu. And ferrets are often used as proxies for humans. When word got out that the two scientists were ferrets detailing their experiments, making a bluebird, the outcry was extreme. The scientists were told to stop. But they refused. They wanted to see if H5N1 and H5N1 in order to prevent a pandemic, but critics said the experiments could instead cause one – or provide with an outbreak manufacturing guide.

## Сообщения о различных инцидентах, связанных с нарушением биобезопасности



2 сентября 2011 г. в Национальном институте здравоохранения США в Нью-Йорке после укуса лабораторного животного, инфицированного рекомбинантным вирусом гриппа, исследователь был отправлен домой на карантин без наблюдения

В сентябре 2016 г. при проведении опытов с животными, зараженными рекомбинантным штаммом вируса Чикунгунья, аспирантка Вашингтонского университета проколола перчатку, о чем сообщила только через 4 дня

9 и 16 ноября 2013 г.  
в лаборатории  
Университета  
Висконсина произошли  
два несчастных случая,  
связанные с  
модифицированными  
штаммами ВПГП

## Ухудшение эпидобстановки в местах размещения лабораторий

2011, 2014-2015 годы - Вспышки холеры (заболевших - 933 чел.)

2016-2017 годы - Ботулизм (заболевших – 205 чел., скончались – 49 чел.)

2017 год - Вспышки гепатита А в Запорожье, Одесской области, Харькове (заболевших – 106 чел.)

2018 год – Возникновение заболевания сибирской язвой вблизи института им. И.И.Мечникова в Одессе (заболевших - 5 чел.)

2020 год - Заболевание и гибель в течение двух дней военнослужащих в Харькове от вируса, схожего с гриппом (заболевших – более 200 чел., скончались – 20 чел.)

2008 год – Начало вспышки АЧС неизвестного происхождения

2013-2014 годы - Вспышка Конго-Крымской геморрагической лихорадкой при отсутствии зараженных переносчиков заболевания

2013-2015 годы - Вспышка кори (заболевших – 11000 чел.)

## ≡ The Intercept\_

- In 2013, a researcher at Kansas State University in Manhattan, Kansas, pricked their finger while drawing blood from a chicken infected with H5N1 avian influenza. The scientist had handed a used syringe to an assistant while trying to get a better grasp of the chicken's jugular vein. The assistant returned it needle side out, piercing through the scientist's gloves. The researcher was prescribed Tamiflu for one week and told to immediately report a fever. Kansas State University did not respond to a request to comment

- Between April 2013 and March 2014, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill reported five mouse escapes, including one of an animal that had been infected with SARS four days earlier. In a letter to NIH, a biosafety specialist argued that the frequency of escapes was due to the "complex research taking place at our institute" rather than a culture of

**«...В период с апреля 2013 г. по март 2014 г. в университете Северной Каролины исчезло 5 лабораторных мышей, одна из которых была заражена ТОРС...»**


## ≡ The Intercept

- In 2018, a researcher at the Food and Drug Administration's Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research in Silver Spring, Maryland, contracted a MRSA infection, a condition that can become severe if left untreated, after working with the antibiotic-resistant bacteria MRSA in the lab. The researcher could not be reached for comment.

**«...В 2018 году исследователь FDA (Сильверспринг, Мериленд) был инфицирован ближневосточным респираторным синдромом...»**

«Инфицирован ближневосточным  
респираторным синдромом...»






# Проект «Новый американский век»



Джон Роберт Болтон  
Второй  
(John Robert Bolton II)

Государственный и политический деятель США, в 2018-2019 году советник президента США по национальной безопасности, один из директоров НКО «Проект «Новый американский век»

В 2001 году возглавлял делегацию США на Пятой обзорной конференции КБТО, где американская сторона отказалась от предлагаемых правил и процедур проверки вероятных мест хранения биологического оружия, сославшись на то, что это угрожает национальным интересам США



of defense reviews over the past decade testify to the failure to chart a consistent course. In fact, there have been half a dozen formal defense reviews, and the Pentagon is now gearing up for a second Quadrennial Defense Review in 2001. Unless this "QDR II" matches the U.S. military forces and resources to a viable American strategy, it, too, will fail.

These failures are not without cost: already, they place at risk an historic opportunity. After the victories of the past century – two world wars, the Cold War and most recently the Gulf War – the United States finds itself as the uniquely powerful leader of a coalition of free and prosperous states that faces no immediate great-power challenge.

The American peace has proven itself peaceful, stable and durable. It has, over the past decade, provided the geopolitical framework for widespread economic growth and the spread of American principles of liberty and democracy. Yet no moment in international politics can be frozen in time; even a global Pax Americana will not preserve itself.

of an extended "procurement holiday" that has resulted in the premature aging of most weapon systems, from an increasingly obsolescent and inadequate military infrastructure, from a deteriorating industrial base poorly structured to the "arsenal of democracy" for the 21<sup>st</sup> century, from a lack of innovation that threatens the technological and operational advantages enjoyed by U.S. forces for a generation and upon which American strategy depends. Finally, and most dangerously, the social fabric of the military is frayed and worn. U.S. armed forces suffer from a degraded quality of life derived from middle-class expectations, upon which an all-volunteer force depends. Enlisted men and women and junior officers increasingly lack confidence in their senior leaders, whom they believe will not tell unpleasant truths to their civilian leaders. In sum, as the American peace reaches across the globe, the force that preserves that peace is increasingly overwhelmed by its tasks.

This is no paradox; it is the inevitable consequence of the failure to match military means to geopolitical ends. Underlying the failed strategic and defense reviews of the past decade is the idea that the collapse of

Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century

the Soviet Union had created a "strategic prize." In other words, until another great-power challenge emerges, the United States can enjoy a respite from the demands of international leadership. Like a boxer between championship bouts, America can afford to relax and live the good life, certain that there would be enough time to shape up for the next big challenge. Thus the United States could afford to reduce its military forces, close bases overseas, halt major weapons programs and reap the financial benefits of the "peace dividend." But as we have seen over the past decade, there has been no shortage of powers around the world who have taken the collapse of the Soviet empire as an opportunity to expand their own influence and challenge the American-led security order.

Beyond the faulty notion of a strategic pause, recent defense reviews have suffered from an incorrect understanding of the military dimension of the Cold War struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. American containment strategy did not proceed from the assumption that the Cold War would be a purely military struggle, in which the U.S. Army matched the Red Army tank for tank; rather, the United States would seek to deter the Soviet military while deterring them economically and ideologically over time. And, even within the realm of military affairs, the practice of deterrence allowed for what in military terms is called "an economy of force."

	Cold War Bipolar	21 <sup>st</sup> Century Unipolar
Security system	Bipolar	Unipolar
Strategic goal	Contain Soviet Union	Preserve Pax Americana
Main military mission(s)	Deter Soviet expansionism	Secure and expand zones of democratic peace; deter rise of new great-power competitor; defend key regions; exploit transformation of war
Main military (threats)	Potential global war across many theaters	Potential theater wars spread across globe
Focus of strategic competition	Europe	East Asia

Over the decade of the post-Cold-War period, however, almost everything has changed. The Cold War world was a bipolar world; the 21<sup>st</sup> century world is – for the moment, at least – decidedly unipolar, with

Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century

## V CREATING TOMORROW'S DOMINANT FORCE

To preserve American military preeminence in the coming decades, the Department of Defense must move more aggressively to experiment with new technologies and operational concepts, and seek to exploit the emerging revolution in military affairs, information technologies, in particular, are becoming more prevalent and significant components of current military systems. These information technologies are having the same kind of transforming effects on military affairs as they are having in the larger world. The effects of this military transformation will have profound implications for how wars are fought, what kinds of weapons will dominate the battlefield and, inevitably, which nations enjoy military preeminence.

The United States enjoys every prospect of leading this transformation. Indeed, it was the improvements in capabilities acquired during the American defense build-up of the 1980s that limited it and then confounded, during Operation Desert Storm, that a revolution in military affairs was at hand. At the same time, the process of military transformation will present opportunities for America's adversaries to develop new capabilities that in turn will create new challenges for U.S. military preeminence.

Moreover, the Pentagon, constrained by limited budgets and pressing current missions, has seen funding for experimentation and transformation crowd out in recent years. Spending on military research and development has been reduced dramatically over the past decade. Indeed, during the mid-1980's, when the Defense

Department was in the midst of the Reagan buildup which was primarily an effort to expand existing forces and field traditional weapons systems, research spending represented 20 percent of total Pentagon budgets. By contrast, today's research and development accounts total only 8 percent of defense spending. And even this reduced total is primarily for upgrades of current weapons. Without increased spending on basic research and development the United States will be unable to exploit the RMA and preserve its technological edge on future battlefields.

Any serious effort at transformation must occur within the larger framework of U.S. national security strategy, military missions and defense budgets. The United States cannot simply declare a "strategic pause" while experimenting with new technologies and operational concepts. Nor can it choose to pursue a transformation strategy that would decouple American and allied interests.

A transformation strategy that solely pursued capabilities for projecting force from the United States, for example, and sacrificed forward basing and presence, would be at odds with larger American

**The effects of the RMA will have profound implications for how wars are fought, what weapons dominate, and which nations enjoy military preeminence.**

## Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century

and even unattended "missiles in a box" will allow not only for long-range power projection but for sustained power projection. Simulation technologies will vastly improve military training and mission planning.

Although it may take several decades for the process of transformation to unfold, in time, the art of warfare on air, land, and sea will be vastly different than it is today, and "combat" likely will take place in new dimensions: in space, "cyber-space," and perhaps the world of microbes. Air warfare may no longer be fought by pilots manning tactical fighter aircraft sweeping the skies of opposing fighters, but a regime dominated by long-range, stealthy unmanned craft. On land, the clash of massive, combined-arms armored forces may be replaced by the dashes of much lighter, stealthier and information-intensive forces, augmented by fleets of robots, some small enough to fit in soldiers' pockets. Control of the sea could be largely determined not by fleets of surface combatants and aircraft carriers, but from land- and space-based systems, forcing navies to maneuver and fight underwater. Space itself will become a theater of war, as nations gain access to space capabilities and come to rely on them; further, the distinction between military and commercial space systems – combatants and noncombatants – will become blurred. Information systems will become an important focus of attack, particularly for U.S. enemies seeking to short-circuit sophisticated American forces. And advanced forms of biological warfare that can "target" specific genotypes may transform biological warfare from the realm of terror to a politically useful tool.

This is merely a glimpse of the possibilities inherent in the process of transformation, not a precise prediction. Whatever the shape and direction of this revolution in military affairs, the implications for continued American military preeminence will be profound. As argued above, there are many reasons to believe that U.S. forces already possess nascent revolutionary capabilities, particularly in the realms of intel-

ligence, command and control, and long-range precision strikes. Indeed, these capabilities are sufficient to allow the armed services to begin an "interim," short- to medium-term process of transformation.

«...военные действия будут значительно отличаться от того, что происходит сегодня, в том числе «боевые действия» вероятно будут осуществляться в новых пространствах: космосе, киберпространстве и, возможно, мире микробов...»

ilitary departments and the service chiefs of staff is increasingly inappropriate to the demands of a rapidly changing technological, strategic and geopolitical landscape. The central

**Until the process of transformation is treated as an enduring military mission – worthy**

«...продвинутые формы биологического оружия, способные нацеливаться на определенные генотипы, смогут переопределить роль биологического оружия – вместо средства устрашения, оно станет выгодно применяться в политике...»

foster competing points of view about the how to apply new technologies to enduring missions.

This is especially debilitating to the process of transformation, which has

Проект «Новый американский век» (Project for the New American Century (PNAC)) – американская неоконсервативная некоммерческая политическая организация, созданная в 1997 году для продвижения американского мирового лидерства





# Реализация военно-биологических программ США на территории Украины

8

## Реализация проектов в рамках Программы снижения биологической угрозы



### TAP-2

Серологический мониторинг сапа на Украине и оценка методов его диагностики

### TAP-3

Анализ рисков распространения африканской чумы свиней и вируса свиного гриппа среди диких свиней на Украине

### UP-2

Картографирование патогенов

### UP-4

Изучение возможности распространения особо опасных патогенов через мигрирующих птиц

### UP-8

Изучение распространенности вируса Конго-Крымской геморрагической лихорадки и хантавирусов

### UP-10

Изучение распространения африканской чумы свиней на Украине в дикой природе и через торговые пути



#### Ukraine Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP)

##### Program (BTRP) Phase IIb

HDTRA1-08-D-0007-

0004

CDRL A017

Country Science Plan (CSP)

Prepared for:



Prepared by:

BLACK & VEATCH SPECIAL PROJECTS CORP.



In collaboration with Metabiota, Inc.



Rev. 06

Submitted 27 June 2019

Table 1. CBR Projects Status

Project Designation	Project Title	Planned	Ongoing	Completed	Not Started
CBR UP-1	Focal Infection Caused by <i>Islebrandia</i> spp. and <i>Coccidia</i> ( <i>C. burnetti</i> ) in Different Landscape Zones of Ukraine				
CBR UP-2	Incorporating GIS, Remote Sensing, and Laboratory Diagnostics into Human and Veterinary Disease Surveillance for <i>Yersinia</i> and <i>Anthrax</i> in Ukraine (in Ukraine: surveillance of the Epidemiological Forecasting System for Zoonotic Diseases (EFSZ) Technology)				
CBR UP-3	Epidemiologic Algorithms and Molecular Approaches for Differential Diagnosis of Severe Feline Illness of Unknown Etiology in Ukraine				
CBR UP-4	Risk assessment of selected Especially Dangerous Pathogens potentially carried by migratory birds over Ukraine				
CBR UP-5	Ecological-Epidemiological Surveillance for Identifying the Prevalence and Genetic Diversity of Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever Virus, Hantavirus, Tick-Borne Encephalitis Virus, Pseudo-rabies Virus, and Leptospira spp. in Ukraine				
CBR UP-6	Ecological and Epidemiological Evaluation of the Prevalence of Natural Focal Infections Caused by <i>Rickettsia</i> spp. and <i>Coccidia</i> ( <i>C. burnetti</i> ) in Different Landscape Zones of Ukraine				
CBR UP-7	Surveillance capacity building and determination of disease baseline for Brucellosis in domestic and wild animal populations of Ukraine				
CBR UP-8	Prevalence of Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever virus and Hantavirus in Ukraine and the potential requirement for differential diagnosis of suspect leptospirosis patients				
CBR UP-9	The spread of African swine fever virus (ASFV) in domestic pigs and wild boar in Ukraine - building capacity for insight into the transmission of ASFV through characterization of virus isolates by genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis				
CBR UP-10	Regional Field-to-Table Risk Assessment of the spread of African swine fever virus (ASFV) across Ukraine in wild fauna and via consumer trade routes - insight into the development of effective ASFV quarantine strategies and public policy				

Page 9 of 63

Table 2. TAPs Status

Project Designation	Project Title	Planned	Ongoing	Completed	Not Started
T01 Human TAP-1	Investigation of CAP (Cysticercus) and Necrotic Arachnoid Sequencing Capabilities at the Ukrainian Research and Anti-Plague Institute (URAPI) in Order to Foster and Improve Viral Diagnostics				
T01 Veterinary TAP-2	Development and Use of the Express Method for Avian Influenza Virus (AIV) Diagnostics Based on Reverse Transcription-Loop Mediated Isothermal Amplification (RT-LAMP)				
T01 Veterinary TAP-3	Analysis of the Threat of Spread of African Swine Fever (ASF) and Classical Swine Fever (CSF) in Wild Boar Populations in Ukraine				
T04 Veterinary TAP-1	Molecular Characterization of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus (HPAIV) and Virulent Newcastle Disease Virus (VNDV) Isolated in Ukraine				
T04 Veterinary TAP-2	Serological Monitoring of Glanders in Ukraine and Evaluation of Serological Methods for Laboratory Diagnosis of Glanders				
T04 Veterinary TAP-3	Analysis and Review of Ukrainian Legislation and Guidelines for Veterinary Laboratory Diagnostics Quality Assurance, Biological Safety, and Biological Security for Specified FIDPs, with the Aim of Identifying Potential Enhancements to the Veterinary System of Ukraine				
T04 Veterinary TAP-4	Community Outreach to Support Understanding of ASF Ecology and Epidemiology in Eastern Europe: Training and Implementation for Methods and Strategies for Control and Prevention				
T04 Veterinary TAP-5	Grantmanship in Action: Development and Submission of a National Science Foundation (NSF) Grant Application for Avian Influenza Research in Ukraine				
T04 Veterinary TAP-6	Analysis of the threat of spread of African swine fever and classical swine fever in wild boar populations in Ukraine: Improving diagnosis, surveillance, and prevention				

Page 10 of 63

### P-781

Изучение спектра патогенов, распространяемых летучими мышами

### P-3007

Изучение распространения возбудителей опасных инфекций водным путем


### P-364

Оценка инфекций, распространяемых членистоногими на Украине


### P-444

Мониторинг птичьего гриппа, болезни Ньюкасла, парамиксовирусов среди диких птиц


## Передача штаммов микроорганизмов и биоматериалов в другие страны



## Проведение исследований на украинских военнослужащих и душевнобольных



## Умалчивание о совместной военно-биологической деятельности США и Украины



В ежегодно представляемых в ООН материалах не упоминается о совместной деятельности США и Украины






# Инициативы Российской Федерации к Девятой обзорной конференции КБТО

9

## Рабочие документы Российской Федерации к Девятой обзорной конференции КБТО



## Российские инициативы по укреплению КБТО

1. Возобновление переговоров по разработке юридически обязывающего протокола к Конвенции, который включал бы списки микроорганизмов, токсинов и оборудования, носил бы всеобъемлющий характер, учитывал бы современные научно-технические достижения в области биологии и предусматривал эффективный механизм контроля

2. В Мерах укрепления доверия:  
- дополнить форму А, части 2 iv) сведениями обо всех медико-биологических исследованиях и разработках в области биологической защиты, осуществляемых за пределами национальной территории, в том числе в сотрудничестве с другими государствами, включая медико-биологическую деятельность, осуществляемую с участием или по заказу специальных служб (профильных министерств) государства-участника;  
- дополнить форму G сведениями об объектах по производству вакцин для животных

3. Создание научно-консультативного комитета для оценки достижений в областях науки и технологий, имеющих отношение к Конвенции, который имел бы широкую географическую представленность и равные права участников. По результатам своей работы Комитет мог бы помимо прочего разрабатывать предложения по совершенствованию формата Мер укрепления доверия